Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained: Addressing the Critical Gaps in Risk-Taking Capital for Social Enterprise by Emerson, Jed et al.
SKOLL CENTRE FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP WORKING PAPER
NOTHING VENTURED, 
NOTHING GAINED
ADDRESSING THE CRITICAL GAPS IN RISK-TAKING 
CAPITAL FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
JED EMERSON, TIM FREUNDLICH AND JIM FRUCHTERMAN
WITH LOREN BERLIN AND KEELY STEVENSON
2 NOTHING VENTURED, NOTHING GAINED: ADDRESSING CRITICAL GAPS IN RISK-TAKING CAPITAL FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
SKOLL CENTRE FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
THE WORLDWIDE GROWTH OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IS
THREATENED BY A DEARTH OF CAPITAL. SOCIAL ENTERPRISES
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THIS CHALLENGE?
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THE PROBLEM
THE CAPITAL GAP
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Social enterprises are creating new and exciting 
solutions to society’s problems. Increasing 
numbers of ventures are being launched to address 
challenges – from poverty to health, education to 
the environment. Despite many of these emerging 
successes, most of these enterprises face a 
common problem: inability to secure growth capital. 
Speciﬁcally, there is an abject lack of risk-taking 
capital. The result is that proven social enterprises 
are starved of the capital required to grow to an 
appropriate size. Yet there is also an increasing 
number of mission-based investors looking for 
opportunities that go beyond traditional grants and 
into the realm of debt and equity, and are willing to 
consider new models of risk and return. However, 
these two groups are struggling to ﬁnd one another. 
Our collective inability to transcend this 
capital challenge limits the effectiveness of both 
entrepreneur and investor. More importantly, the 
lack of appropriate capital means needed services, 
support and opportunities remain beyond the grasp 
of many in the US and Europe, not to mention the 
developing world. With this paper we want to help 
move the discussion forward toward diverse solutions 
to the growth capital challenge facing many high-
performing social enterprises throughout the world. 
KEY CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND THE 
CAPITAL MARKET THAT SERVES IT
By “social enterprise” we mean the application 
of business models and acumen to address social 
issues, whether through nonproﬁt or for-proﬁt 
corporate structures. The capital counterpart 
to social enterprise, “social ﬁnance”, may be 
understood as a broad area wherein various forms 
of capital are structured in ways that consider 
and value both ﬁnancial performance and social 
value creation. Put simply, between the traditional 
CHAPTER 1
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approach to ﬁnancing nonproﬁt ventures through 
grants, fundraising and limited use of debt, and the 
traditional approach to ﬁnancing for-proﬁt ventures 
through market-rate private equity and debt, there 
is a funding gap into which an increasing number of 
social enterprises are falling. 
Organisations that are growing fast need capital 
to increase production capacity and develop their 
products and markets, as well as for everyday 
working expenses. Debt is usually only applicable 
for certain needs. Equity or equity-like capital forms 
the majority of this capital need. In the case of 
nonproﬁts, grants can play a role.
Start-up nonproﬁt corporations (which can be 
one form of social enterprise) are usually able to 
access gifts to support demonstration projects and 
innovative strategies. In fact, many foundations 
pride themselves on making grants to the “new” 
or the “innovative.” While not necessarily an easy 
process, the fact remains that in the US and Europe 
funds are available to catalyse, incubate, launch 
and operate social enterprises at a small scale. 
Many social entrepreneurs attain initial success by 
piecing together small grants of a few thousand to a 
few hundred thousand dollars in order to meet their 
initial start-up requirements. However, growth capital 
(also known as “expansion capital”) remains difﬁcult 
for entrepreneurs to access. In many cases it is 
simply unavailable. 
Start-up for-proﬁt corporations (which may be 
social enterprises) are able to access funding from 
“friends, family and fools” (as the saying goes), 
cobbling together enough to test out their new 
business concept or strategy. In the same manner as 
their nonproﬁt counterparts, they may ﬁnd funds to 
get going, demonstrate proof of concept and – if they 
were traditional, for-proﬁt corporations focused upon 
proﬁt-maximising strategies – go on to compete for 
private equity investments mixed with some level of 
debt. If, however, they are social enterprises – for-
proﬁt corporations that balance ﬁnancial returns with 
a social mission – they face a similar dilemma to 
their nonproﬁt cousins. For-proﬁt social enterprises 
of this sort often ﬁnd they are able to raise initial, 
launch funding, but lack access to expansion capital 
that does not seek a full, conventional market-rate 
return on investment.
The bottom line is that in all too many instances 
neither the for-proﬁt nor the nonproﬁt social 
enterprise is able to secure adequate capital to 
enable it to move from start-up to the next level of 
development. The appropriate form of capital to 
support the enterprise’s development simply does 
not exist at any scale. It is worth noting that venture 
capital and early private equity is by its very nature 
competitive and scarce, even in the relatively mature 
US markets. In Europe it is even scarcer and in 
the developing world almost non-existent. Although 
there is certainly growing interest in building up 
equity access for conventional small and medium-
sized enterprises, social enterprises, with their 
unconventional risk-return model, will still ﬁnd 
growth capital hard to access.
Therefore, the 800-pound gorilla in the social 
enterprise capital market has become the very 
real absence of expansion stage capital with a 
true risk-taking proﬁle. What makes for success in 
traditional business development is access to funds 
that allow the ﬁrm to grow and take chances. This 
same capital is equally necessary for a thriving 
social enterprise market. This is not to say that the 
broader, more conventional “socially responsible” 
businesses and certain social enterprises that 
perform well ﬁnancially cannot tap market rate 
capital at some level. The fact that these socially 
motivated enterprises exist is to be applauded, and 
when these business models are conducive, capital 
follows conventional returns, but the core of social 
enterprise activity falls outside the conventional 
deﬁnition of market-rate, risk-adjusted returns. 
Furthermore, we are not talking about capital 
such as:
 asset-backed real estate and facilities funds more 
easily ﬁnanced by debt
 receivables ﬁnancing, or factoring, that is 
increasingly being used in social enterprise business 
models
 small, manageable allocations of funds from 
fundraising dinners, nor the periodic “large grant” 
from one-off donors.
What we are talking about is the need for large 
chunks of capital that play the role of equity capital 
(or “equity-like” capital, in the case of nonproﬁts) 
that may then be used by social enterprises to 
aggressively grow and replicate their operations, 
penetrate new markets, build intellectual property, 
brand presence and so forth. 
In the following chapters we will explore why this 
capital gap exists and why this type of capital is so 
critical, explain what forms of capital are available, 
and put forward some ideas regarding capital 
innovations.
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THE NEED
CHAPTER 2
Consider the following scenario:
You are the seemingly successful leader of an 
exciting break-even social enterprise. You’ve proven 
you can deliver a crucial social outcome for one-
third the cost of traditional approaches, and you’ve 
just completed your ﬁrst two years of successfully 
demonstrating the effectiveness of your approach at 
a local level. You have an ambitious plan to replicate 
your venture more widely across your region and then 
the entire country, and you need expansion capital.
Where do you get it? 
You can’t generate it from your revenues. While 
you have shown the viability of your enterprise, you 
are just leaving the start-up stage, which means 
you’re probably operating at breakeven and are 
undercapitalised at that. Trying to accumulate 
retained earnings to fund growth will lower 
the quality of your product and undercut your 
successful model.
You can’t borrow the funds you need. No 
lender wants to extend you credit to invest in an 
expanding management team and the ensuing 
launch and “burn” costs until you reach break-
even with the regional roll-out (not to mention the 
national roll-out). 
The third-party payers for your social outcomes 
are interested in buying your services, but not 
in investing to expand their availability to other 
populations. They are also risk-averse, so may delay 
buying your product until you’ve proven it in their 
area with other people’s money. 
The traditional suppliers of equity ﬁnancing, 
angel investors and venture capitalists, look at 
your plan to be break-even on a regional and then 
national basis and don’t understand why you’re 
talking to them at all. No chance for a 35%-plus 
annual compound rate of return for the risk they’d 
be taking. And, if you’re at the helm of a nonproﬁt 
social enterprise, nonproﬁt legal structure doesn’t 
allow you to take on equity investments anyway.
Finally, you’re asking for more capital than your 
existing local capital providers are willing to supply. 
As the CEO you are already spending more than 
half your time raising funds for the local venture, 
perhaps piecing together small operating grants from 
traditional donors averse to funding overheads. Your 
early stage connections are long tapped out. How 
are you now going to raise ﬁve times that amount to 
support a regional approach and 20 times that for a 
national launch? Your local funding base doesn’t have 
that kind of funding capacity.
7JED EMERSON, TIM FREUNDLICH AND JIM FRUCHTERMAN
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORDSAID BUSINESS SCHOOL
So, you spend 18 months scraping together 
enough money to do a credible launch in the rest 
of the region, while people elsewhere do not get the 
beneﬁt of your innovative approach. Opportunities 
pass you by, key members of staff move on to 
greener pastures and dreams of a national roll-out 
slip further and further into the future.
This is not just hypothetical, it is the story of 
an increasing number of high-performing social 
enterprises – such as these successful social 
entrepreneurs who have struggled to ﬁnd a new kind 
of unconventional capital. 
TRANSFAIR
Paul Rice founded TransFair USA in 1998 to bring 
the Fair Trade movement to the US. TransFair is 
the primary certiﬁer of Fair Trade coffee in the 
US, and earns approximately 8 cents per pound 
of coffee that it certiﬁes. The growth curve of Fair 
Trade coffee is dramatic. There are similar growth 
opportunities in other Fair Trade commodity markets, 
such as bananas and chocolate. Like many growth 
companies, TransFair now needs to invest to build 
capacity and sustain its growth. Like a for-proﬁt, 
it would use much of this capital to enhance 
market demand. Yet, because it is organised as a 
nonproﬁt organisation, it has found raising money 
very difﬁcult. Plus, helping poor farmers in the 
developing world build more income by investing in 
demand generation for Fair Trade coffee in the US 
is not something that most foundations “go for” or 
seem to understand. 
TransFair has been able to borrow some of its 
needed capital, but now that it has US$4m of debt 
on its balance sheet, it is unable to borrow more. 
Since nonproﬁts cannot offer equity in the same 
fashion as for-proﬁt ventures, there is no equity 
on TransFair’s balance sheet to provide leverage 
for more debt. Rice and his team continue to seek 
grants to provide the growth capital they need, 
and ﬁnd it meeting only a quarter of their planned 
capital requirements.
A different way TransFair could raise the capital 
would be to request grants for direct income support 
for poor farmers. These kinds of grants could 
be thought of as “social good consumption” – a 
foundation paying funds more or less directly to 
the poor farmer to deliver pennies on the dollar of 
impact. It turns out this kind of funding is easier to 
get than investment capital, even though TransFair 
can show that US$1 invested in demand generation 
for Fair Trade coffee results in seven dollars of 
increased income for poor farmers. This is a paradox 
of the nonproﬁt funding sector: it’s often easier to 
ﬁnd a grant that will deliver US$0.85-0.90 of value 
(after overhead and programme costs, assuming a 
very lean operation) than it is to get a grant that will 
deliver US$7 per dollar invested. 
PURA VIDA COFFEE
Pura Vida has a retail approach to Fair Trade 
coffee: it operates coffee shops, mainly on college 
campuses, that sell only Fair Trade coffee. Pura 
Vida’s problem is success: its coffee shops are 
incredibly popular and there is increasing demand 
to establish more outlets. Each requires a signiﬁcant 
investment at the outset, yet the ﬁnancial returns are 
more than sufﬁcient to support this investment.
Pura Vida’s original plan was to borrow money 
to ﬁnance its expansion. Like TransFair, once it had 
several million dollars of debt, it could no longer 
borrow. Yet its market is expanding and the timing is 
crucial. Pura Vida’s solution has been to create a for-
proﬁt afﬁliate with an unusual governance structure. 
The nonproﬁt parent owns a controlling interest in 
the form of a class of “super-common” stock. Debt 
holders in the nonproﬁt have been converted into 
preferred stock holders in the for-proﬁt afﬁliate. Pura 
Vida has pulled off this debt-to-equity conversion 
while maintaining mission commitment through 
the super-common voting control of the for-proﬁt 
afﬁliate. The new challenge is to ﬁnd investors to 
buy more of the preferred stock to provide the growth 
capital Pura Vida needs to continue to grow. On 
the surface, this could be the challenge facing any 
successful for-proﬁt enterprise – the difference is 
that the risk/return structure creates a proposition 
unattractive to conventional capital.
SOCIAL INNOVATION DEMANDS INNOVATION 
IN CAPITAL FORMATION
TransFair and Pura Vida are two examples of social 
innovation. The core concept is that Fair Trade 
coffee is a more effective vehicle for improving the 
lives of coffee workers than traditional government 
programmes or charitable income supports. To truly 
achieve the potential of this social movement, these 
groups (and groups like them) need to grow. The 
proﬁle of the expansion capital these archetypal 
entrepreneurs need is relatively straightforward, but 
not conventional in traditional capital market terms 
(whether grants or equity or debt). These investment 
opportunities require a new kind of capital, with 
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a new set of expectations from both the social 
entrepreneur and the investor.
The venture needs to be able to leverage debt. 
Lenders should be able to see this capital as a true 
risk layer, which means it has to be uncollateralised 
and not put a drain on the cash ﬂows during 
execution of the business model. And, it has to be 
patient capital. If it’s structured as a liability (deeply 
subordinate risk-taking debt), then it must have 
interest and principal payment holidays, and/or be 
repayable through royalties, revenue or proﬁt only.
But, more importantly than its exact character 
and structure, the core capital requirement is 
to establish a new set of expectations between 
entrepreneurs and investors. This pertains to 
linkages on agreed outcomes for repayment of 
principal and/or returns, including forbearance and/
or forgiveness if certain downsides (or even upsides) 
occur. And this means investors must become true 
risk participants in the enterprises they ﬁnance.
Finally, this isn’t traditional equity (or equity-like) 
capital. Although there may well be opportunities for 
healthy returns – even, on occasion, conventional 
market rate risk-adjusted returns – by and large 
these hybrid propositions, whether they be for-
proﬁt or nonproﬁt ventures, have internalised social 
costs in their business models which may decrease 
ﬁnancial returns. 
Put another way, there is often a “a premium for 
doing good.” Philanthropically-minded stakeholders 
should have no trouble reconciling themselves to 
these costs, but more conventional investors might. 
This attempt to shift the risk-return paradigm has 
to be addressed positively. Yes, some enterprises 
need outright grants. Yes, some other enterprises 
can support very close to, if not actually deliver, 
risk-adjusted conventional market rate returns. But, 
there is a growing middle ground of enterprises that 
are structured for optimised delivery of impact and 
strong business models that land somewhere in the 
middle. The clearer we make this, the better. But, 
to complicate matters, this middle ground is highly 
variable from region to region. Put simply, there are 
radically different challenges to attracting capital, 
conducting business and blending social costs into 
enterprise models between Scotland and the Sudan.1
And what of demand? Is there truly a hunger 
for this type of capital among maturing social 
enterprises? The jury is still out, but anecdotal 
evidence does seem to support the proposition. 
Two cases in point: a survey conducted by the 
Social Enterprise Alliance in North America, in 
autumn 2003, found roughly US$58m in appetite 
for expansion capital among 77 maturing social 
enterprises. In summer 2006, Good Capital found a 
need for US$50m across just 25 enterprises ﬁtting 
a narrow proﬁle (US-based with broad US and 
global impact and operations, speciﬁcally looking 
for equity and equity-like capital for expansion 
stage development). 2
If society is serious about positive change, we 
must examine the most effective ways to achieve 
it. Innovation in the allocation of capital for social 
change is needed if existing vehicles are falling short 
of accomplishing our objectives. 
More than anything else, what is needed at 
this time – rather than studies – is action. There 
is profound appetite on the demand side. There 
are certain resources available on the supply side. 
What is missing? It is the afﬁrmative execution of 
institutionalization that connects the sources and uses 
of expansion capital to social enterprise globally. 
1 Of course, the legal structure 
of the organisation will also
differ depending upon the 
country in which the corporation 
has its incorporation.
2 Source: Teaching them to Fish 
conference presentation, 2003, 
Social Enterprise Alliance, and 
data provided by Wes Selke, 
portfolio analyst, Good Capital.
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THE CAPITAL 
MARKET 
LANDSCAPE
CHAPTER 3
HIGH INVOLVEMENT
COMMERCIALCHARITABLE
Venture 
philanthropy
Venture capital
Bank lending
Traditional 
grant-making
LOW INVOLVEMENT
Before exploring solutions to the gap in risk-taking 
growth capital for the social enterprise sector, we 
must ﬁrst understand the ﬁnancing landscape as it 
currently exists. This chapter will present a broad but 
necessarily anecdotal survey of the ﬁeld. 
There are several types of capital available to 
social enterprises, and there are a large variety of 
actors in the social capital market serving them.3 
As the chart shows, there are a number of axes 
across which these players and capital instruments 
may be mapped. The centre vertical line indicates 
where most social enterprise investment resides, 
regardless of the enterprise’s legal status as 
for-proﬁt or nonproﬁt. Whether the ﬁnancing is 
relatively low or high engagement is determined 
by a given investor’s model. The degree to which 
the risk/return paradigm drifts from “charitable” to 
“commercial” depends on the business model, but 
not necessarily on the enterprise structure as a for-
proﬁt or nonproﬁt entity. 
There are three types of capital that, in the 
aggregate, best epitomise characteristics of the 
gap we are discussing. First, there are Community 
Development Venture Capital (CDVC) funds, which 
generally fall just to the left of where “venture 
capital” is placed on the chart. But CDVC funds are 
limited to for-proﬁt enterprises, with a particular 
focus on community development job creation, and 
tend to target the commercial end of the spectrum 
of risk/return. Therefore they only nibble at the 
edges of the lion’s share of social enterprises, which 
are largely nonproﬁt, with diverse business models 
beyond community development and falling along 
a spectrum of risk/return all the way to models 
3 Social capital markets are what ﬁll 
the gaps most nonproﬁts experience 
between revenues they can earn by 
providing services or selling products 
for a fee, and total outlays. 
Meehan, W., Kilmer, D. and 
O’Flanagan, M. (2004), Investing in 
Society, Stanford Social Innovation 
Review, pp 34-43. See also Grants, 
Debt and Equity: The Nonproﬁt 
Capital Market and its Malcontents 
in New Social Entrepreneurs 
(1996), REDF.
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that require signiﬁcant grant or donor money to 
function. Second, there is “equity-like” capital, the 
closest institutionalised example of which, in the 
US at least, is Equity Equivalents. These sorts of 
investment fall still farther to the left of the above 
strategies, and are seen much closer to the low 
engagement end of the spectrum. Third, a number 
of venture philanthropy funds with 100% donor-
sourced monies have experimented with capital 
along the middle vertical (NewSchools Venture Fund 
and Acumen Fund perhaps best epitomise these in 
the US). 
In the table below, REDF (formerly the Roberts 
Enterprise Development Fund) outlines one 
version of the conceptual landscape of ﬁnancing 
on the nonproﬁt side. It goes so far as to posit an 
appropriate mix of capital types and contrasts those 
with actual capital proportions.
A number of conclusions may be drawn from 
this table, not the least of which is that social 
enterprises are neither highly nor effectively 
leveraged. But contrasted with the fact that grants, 
at their current levels, are a relatively ﬁnite source 
of capital, which is largely ill suited to scaling-up 
enterprises that are rapidly expanding, a dire picture 
of undercapitalisation takes shape. Let us explore 
in greater detail the various instruments currently 
available in the capital market.
PRIVATE EQUITY
Equity investors in the for-proﬁt slice of the social 
enterprise sector provide risk capital to new 
funds and enterprises that generate social and 
environmental impacts as well as economic value 
and returns.4 “Equity” generally refers to such 
ﬁnancing vehicles as common and preferred stock.5 
Social enterprises with for-proﬁt legal structures can 
raise equity from ﬁnance providers who are aligned 
with the goals of the venture to create social and 
environmental value. Equity typically takes on the 
following characteristics: 
 long-term investment with unrestricted use of 
resources to facilitate signiﬁcant growth
 owner/partner provider
 ﬂexible/tailored
 uncollateralised
 management support
 repayment from growth.
Not all organisations can issue equity due to their 
nonproﬁt status. However, the UK’s Department 
of Trade and Industry has approved a new legal 
form for social enterprises, the Community Interest 
Company (CIC). Primary legislation was approved 
within the Companies (Audit, Investigations and 
Community Enterprise) Act 2004 and secondary 
TABLE 1: INSTRUMENTS OF THE NONPROFIT CAPITAL MARKET
TYPE OF INSTRUMENT>
FACTORS
Cost of Capital
Board/Investor Role?
Available for Housing
Available for Nonproﬁt 
Business
Appropriate Mix****
Present Mix
GRANTS
0
No
Yes
Yes
15%
90%
PRIs*
3 to 5%
No
Yes
Very limited
15%
0%
DEBT
8 to 10%
Maybe
Yes
Very limited
20%
10%
EQUITY
ROI**, Variable rates
Yes
Yes
No***
50%
0%
* Programme Related 
Investments. See discussion 
to follow
** Return On Investment
*** We refer here to equity 
available for nonproﬁt managed 
business – not co-operatives
**** Estimates of Appropriate 
and Present Mix refer 
speciﬁcally to the nonproﬁt 
business sector and not to 
fund/capital diversiﬁcation in 
the affordable housing real 
estate market.
4 Emerson, J., Spitzer, J., World 
Economic Forum 2006 Article. 
5 Common stock is acquired through 
the purchase of shares. It comes 
with no guaranteed rates of return 
but does allow the investor to 
exercise voting rights and, in some 
cases, hold a seat on the board 
or appropriate committees of the 
corporation. Preferred stock provides 
a set rate of return per share but 
does not allow for full voting or other 
rights. Preferred stock often has a 
“put” or conversion date when the 
stock may be liquidated, whereas 
common stock has no “maturity 
date” and is usually bought and sold 
at will.
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legislation governing CICs came into effect on 1 July 
2005. This form – the only new company structure 
to be introduced in the UK in the past 100 years 
– should make it easier for social enterprises to raise 
the ﬁnance they need. CICs can, for example, issue 
preference shares. Other countries, such as South 
Africa, are also looking into similar models. The 
table below provides examples of several UK social 
ventures that have issued equity in the past decade.
Some of the challenging issues for-proﬁt social 
enterprises face when raising equity include:
 founders/managers fear losing control due to 
changing ownership structure 
 potential for mission drift
 managers or board unfamiliar with equity, due to 
the “philanthropic” cross-over 
 lack of exit strategy/limited liquidity due to 
reduced returns
 unacceptable risk/return trade-offs for economic 
value creation
 lack of expertise to support management capacity 
alongside investment to go to scale 
Most importantly, one of the major limitations 
of equity is that most equity investors remain 
proﬁt seekers, and actions taken by the company 
to maximise proﬁts may compromise its social 
mission. Even if fund managers are not proﬁt 
maximisers, these funds have, to date, been 
targeting investments with the highest potential for 
economic value creation. Thus, a large gap in the 
market remains for those social enterprises that 
have created outcomes that are more balanced 
between economic and social value creation, or even 
emphasise mission over economic proﬁt. 
SOCIAL EQUITY ISSUES (UK)
ORGANISATION
Shared Interest
A co-operative lending society offering ethical 
investment in Fair Trade with developing countries 
Ethical Property Company
EPC buys properties and develops them as centres 
that bring charities, co-operatives, community and 
campaign groups together under one roof to share 
skills and ideas
Traidcraft
A Fair Trade company that works with more than 100 
producer groups, helping them to build sustainable 
livelihoods for the future
Cafédirect
The UK’s largest Fair Trade hot drinks company
Baywind
Creates renewable energy schemes and is the ﬁrst UK 
co-operative to own wind turbines
Source: Nicholls, A., lecture, Saïd Business School, Oxford University, April 2005 
DATE
1995; 1996; 1997; 
1999; 2001; 2002; 
2003; 2004
1999; 2002
 
1984;1986;1991; 
2002 
2004
1996; 1997
TYPE
Bond (5yrs)
Shares 
Shares 
Shares 
IPS Share
AMOUNT (£M)
8.3
(1.0; 1.0; 1.3; 1.0; 1.0; 
1.0; 1.0; 1.0)
5.5
(1.3; 4.2)
21% to inst. investors
5.15 
(0.3; 1.0; 0.6; 3.25)
5.0
Founders retained 40.5%
4.8
(3.1; 1.7)
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There are interesting experiments and ideas 
regarding how best to break down this capital 
mismatch.6 As for implementation, several 
organisations are advancing new approaches:
 Triodos Bank now manages Ethex, an ethical stock 
exchange where social enterprises can ﬂoat shares in 
the knowledge that investors will hold similar ethical 
values. But, on this alternative exchange platform, 
liquidity remains one of the key constraints. 
 The Business Alliance for Local Living Economies 
initiative in the US is working to catalyse local 
equity exchanges that can be better rooted in patient 
capital, and more balanced return propositions in 
line with many social enterprises.
Each of these projects represents efforts to provide 
a more effective platform for connecting mission-
driven ventures with the capital they need to grow.
Equity investments in social enterprises are 
beginning to ﬁnd their way to emerging markets 
as well. For example, ShoreCap International 
(“ShoreCap”), an afﬁliate of Chicago-based 
ShoreBank, is an international private equity 
company “seeking to invest in small business banks 
and regulated microﬁnance institutions in developing 
and transitional economies.” In 2005 ShoreCap 
invested, or committed to invest, US$4.1m in 
XacBank in Mongolia, Eskhata Bank in Tajikistan 
and BRAC Bank in Afghanistan, increasing the 
seven-year-old ﬁrm’s total portfolio to US$9.5m in 
eight institutions across Africa, Asia and Eastern 
Europe. To date, ShoreCap has achieved both 
impressive ﬁnancial and social returns. The company 
has an average return on assets of 23% and an 
average return on equity of 18%. The company’s 
impact includes the growth of the institutions in 
which it invests – enabling them to collectively lend 
US$200m in new loans to 207,000 micro and small 
borrowers. The borrowers will use that US$200m 
to start small businesses, pay for their children to 
attend school, secure safe housing, and generally 
stabilise and improve their lives.7
ANGELS: START-UP FUNDING
Socially motivated angel investors are important 
actors in this sphere. A recent McKinsey report 
analysing the experience of Investors’ Circle in the 
US found that very little sacriﬁce is required in terms 
of ﬁnancial returns when it comes to social purpose 
equity investing into for-proﬁt enterprises. Investors’ 
Circle is a group of 100 US angel investors that 
screens 350-700 social ventures per year. These 
annual screenings usually result in 50-70 deals 
being presented to the network by primarily for-proﬁt 
entities. Thus far, members of Investors’ Circle have 
invested US$90m in 150 equity deals since 1992 
and the ﬁnancial returns generated by member 
funds have ranged between 5% and 18% – which 
is only slightly lower than that of other early-stage 
angel investors in traditional for-proﬁt private equity 
investments8. With recent emphasis being added on 
“patient capital”, Investor’s Circle is entering the 
social enterprise space more positively by overtly 
examining the risk/return and time horizon issues of 
angel investing. 
SOCIAL AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS: GROWTH FUNDING
Social venture capital funds generally target 
conventional market rates of return but focus on 
industries with inherent social beneﬁts, such as 
renewable energy, environmental technologies, 
healthcare and education-related information 
technologies.9
Examples include Foursome Investments 
Limited, Commons Capital, Calvert Venture Partners, 
Expansion Capital Partners and Solstice Capital.10 
One of the earliest pioneers of social ﬁnance is a 
Dutch ﬁnancial group founded in 1968, Triodos 
Bank. Alongside a suite of many other ﬁnancial 
services, Triodos’ Innovation Fund BV was designed 
as a venture capital vehicle for companies focused 
on culture, “wellness”, renewable energy, organic 
food, Fair Trade and clean technologies.
As previously mentioned, another type of venture 
capital (or “VC”) fund in the US targets community 
development-related enterprises that aim to create 
jobs, support ownership by marginalised communities 
or spur local economic development in impoverished 
areas. Examples of this type of fund include: Paciﬁc 
Community Ventures (PCV), Baltimore Venture 
Capital Fund, Bridges Community Ventures, The 
Abell Foundation Venture Fund (equity is 15% of its 
programme-related investment – or PRI – portfolio), 
Community Development Venture Capital Alliance, 
Morino Institute, and Community Development 
Venture Capital Alliance Central Fund. 11
In a May 2006 paper, Paciﬁc Community 
Ventures’ executive director, Penelope Douglas, 
made a compelling argument for the creation 
of a sub-asset class within private equity.12 PCV 
has demonstrated that it can provide competitive 
6 Emerson, J. (2000), Riding the 
Bleeding Edge presents the vision 
of a nonproﬁt stock exchange and 
framework for tracking social equity.
7 Providing Capital and Expertise to 
Financial Institutions Serving Micro 
and Small Businesses (ShoreCap 
International & ShoreCap Exchange, 
Annual Report 2005) 
http://tinyurl.com/23fsk4.
8 Carden, S.D., Darragh, O. (2004), 
A Halo For Angel Investors, The 
McKinsey Quarterly
9 In 2002, the number of venture 
capital social/environmental deals 
grew at 19%, compared with 
13% growth in overall venture 
capital deals. The typical deal 
size was US$250,000-US$3m. 
In 2002, social/environmental 
investments represented 6.2% 
of the total number of venture 
capital deals and 0.6% of the total 
capital invested, according to the 
2003 Columbia Business School 
Research Initiative on Social 
Entrepreneurship (RISE) report.
10 Olsen, S., and Tasch, W., 
(editor), Mission-Related Investing, 
Investors’ Circle
http://tinyurl.com/247v2q
11 www.cdvca.org
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ﬁnancial returns and risk diversiﬁcation, along 
with community beneﬁts. It also draws attention 
to historic returns of funds managed by Kentucky 
Highlands and Coastal Enterprises, at 18% and 
17% respectively.
In the global landscape, equity investment 
funds in the area of microﬁnance are perhaps 
the most prominent and recent developments. 
One mature example is ProFund, which closed 
in 2005 after investing for ten years in Latin 
American microﬁnance institutions. Even with the 
systemic ﬁnancial failures and social or political 
chaos in some regions where it was investing, 
ProFund achieved a 6.65% internal rate of return 
while maintaining operating fees below 3%. 
ProFund, as an experiment, made it much more 
attractive for Latin American commercial banks 
to supply capital to microﬁnance institutions. 
Since then, the US$10m Bellwether Fund in 
India and US$15m AfriCap Fund in Africa have 
been modelled as country-based funds aiming for 
similar positive outcomes.
Beyond microﬁnance, there remains a gap in 
equity funds for other social enterprise industries 
globally. One newly created fund trying to address 
that gap is Aavishkaar. Aavishkaar is targeting 
32% per investment return by providing ﬁnancial 
and business building support to growth stage 
microventures serving the development of rural 
and semi-urban India. Additionally, the energy 
sector has several equity funds created to stimulate 
future investment capital from commercial 
ﬁnance providers. The IFC’s Photovoltaic Market 
Transformation Initiative launched in 1998 
with US$25m of ﬂexible ﬁnancing, including 
equity, aimed at promoting the sustainable 
commercialisation of solar technology in developing 
countries. It has committed to nine projects in India, 
Kenya and Morocco.
It is important to note that these funds serve 
a relatively small percentage of the market of 
social enterprises because their requirements for 
ﬁnancial returns usually take priority over those of 
social returns. For example, Foursome Investments 
Limited is an investment management company that 
manages two private equity funds in early stage and 
development stage growth businesses, and it seeks 
businesses with a measurable beneﬁt to people’s 
lives. Foursome reports that 10-20 deals per year 
cannot be ﬁnanced because the social mission 
would reduce the amount of expected ﬁnancial 
return.13 Bridges Community Ventures turned away 
40 applications for social enterprise funding in 
2004 for the same reason. This is a common theme 
for equity investors, which leaves a huge number 
of organisations without access to start-up and 
expansion capital. 
NONPROFIT AND FOUNDATION “PRI” 
AND “MRI” EQUITY INVESTORS
Nonproﬁt organisations and Foundations are 
beginning to consider investment of their fund 
balances and endowments (respectively) in social 
enterprises. In the US, when catalysed ﬁrst and 
foremost by a social purpose, and only secondarily by 
expectation of ﬁnancial returns, this type of capital 
is categorised as “programme-related investment” 
(PRI).14 PRIs therefore tend to be “below market”. 
When ﬁnancial returns are sought, and expected 
to be at market rate, the term “mission-related 
investing” (MRI) is used.
As a US foundation programme, Rockefeller 
Foundation’s ProVenEx has reviewed over 250 deals 
and made 12 investments since 1999, totalling 
US$12.2m with expected returns of 3%-10%.15 
The FB Heron Foundation16 is another example of 
a US foundation which actively invests in housing, 
employment and enterprise opportunities for the 
poor, using both debt and equity instruments. It 
has distributed more than US$17m in PRIs and 
US$45m in MRIs. This constitutes more than 
25% of its assets.17 A further US$150bn could 
be released for social purposes if all foundations 
did the same with their assets, given that there are 
approximately US$600bn in foundation assets. 
The third example is not a foundation, but a 
US-based nonproﬁt organisation named Acumen 
Fund. Acumen Fund raises donor capital and, 
through a portfolio approach, uses debt and equity 
instruments to aid in the development of social 
enterprises delivering critical goods and services to 
the global poor. 
The growth of the social enterprise sector has 
inspired grant-making from nontraditional sources, 
including the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank. 
To support the development of high-impact social 
enterprises in emerging markets, the IFC launched 
its “Capturing Value” competition in which it awards 
US$500,000 in prize money to emerging market 
companies that are both generating an economic 
proﬁt and accounting for social, environmental and 
corporate governance practices. According to the 
IFC, the competition functions not simply to provide 
12 Douglas, P., Sirull, B., November, 
P. (2006), Development Investment 
Capital: Three Steps to Establishing 
an Asset Class for Investing in 
Underserved Markets.
For a copy of the paper, contact 
bsirull@pcvmail.org  
To read a review of the paper, visit 
www.socialfunds.com/news/article.
cgi/2008.html.
13 Howard, L. and Giddens, M. 
(editor) (2004), Equity-like Capital 
for Social Ventures, Bridges 
Community Ventures, London. 
14 Interestingly, if market rate returns 
are attained, a PRI designation may 
still apply. It is a matter of intent, 
not outcome. In the US a PRI is a 
designation by the IRS that allows 
a foundation to relax its ﬁduciary or 
“prudent man” rules of investment, 
and to count an investment towards 
its grants payout requirement.
15 Howard, L. and Giddens, M. 
(editor) (2004), Equity-like Capital 
for Social Ventures, Bridges 
Community Ventures, London.
16  The FB Heron Foundation 
focuses on promoting ﬁve wealth 
creation strategies: home ownership, 
business development, childcare, 
community development and access 
to capital. 
17 FB Heron Foundation website 
www.fbheron.org
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grant funding to social enterprises in emerging 
markets but to also raise awareness about the work 
of these enterprises in order to generate interest from 
the international investing community. It is the IFC’s 
hope that “Capturing Value,” whose judges include 
representatives from the United Nations and the 
World Resources Institute, will catalyse investment 
in emerging markets, where social entrepreneurs also 
struggle to secure funding.18
DEBT/LOANS 
Debt, deﬁned as money loaned at a stated interest 
rate for a ﬁxed term of years, is available in social 
enterprise capital markets in a variety of forms. 
Like most capital instruments, debt structuring 
is based on the classic risk/return equation. 
That is, the higher the risk assumed by the debt 
issuer, the higher the corresponding interest rate 
charged to the debtor. While interest rates are an 
important component of the debt calculation, they 
must be considered in relation to other aspects 
of the debt capital, including the type of debt (eg 
subordinated debt), the structure of the payments 
(eg is there a balloon payment?), the life term of 
the loan, and the points associated with closing 
the loan. Because debt capital creates liabilities 
on the balance sheets of enterprises, it needs 
equity or net assets to be leveraged. Many types 
of debt ﬁnancing are currently available to social 
entrepreneurs – here are a few examples.
TRADITIONAL BANKING INSTITUTIONS
Traditional banking institutions in the US provide 
debt capital to social enterprises in two forms: 
business loans and loans that qualify for Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) credits. It is – theoretically 
– possible for a social entrepreneur to qualify for 
the same traditional business loan used by for-proﬁt 
entities. However, while this sort of debt capital is 
more readily accessed by for-proﬁt social enterprises 
than nonproﬁt ones, it is not easily accessed by 
either, owing to the inherent risks involved in 
ﬁnancing an entity that puts equal emphasis on 
ﬁnancial return and social mission. Debt capital is 
also available to US social enterprises thanks to the 
Community Reinvestment Act. Enacted in 1977, 
the CRA obliges depository institutions to invest in 
the communities they serve by ﬁnancing projects 
that address community needs. To that end, US 
banks offer a limited number of low or zero-interest 
loans to nonproﬁt social enterprises to meet their 
Federal obligations. Unfortunately, the availability of 
debt capital in the form of CRA loans has decreased 
recently due to changes in the regulations. 
FOUNDATION PRI DEBT
In addition to traditional grants, foundations may 
offer loans to social enterprises. Many major US 
foundations have made such programme-related 
investments, but, in total, less than 1% of US 
foundations by number have made PRIs, and just 
one-tenth of 1% of total assets of foundations are in 
such mission-based investments.19
An example of a PRI loan facility is the Esmée 
Fairbairn programme. Launched in 2003, it offers 
both secured and unsecured loans of between 
£10,000 and £250,000 to the UK voluntary sector 
at interest rates from 0% to 7%, for terms of up to 
ﬁve years. The programme is a pilot to help extend 
the foundation’s support beyond grants, and to learn 
more about the demand for loan ﬁnance. It is run in 
co-operation with Charity Bank, which provides due 
diligence and loan administration services, as well as 
acting as a collection agency.
BONDS, INVESTMENT NOTES AND 
NONTRADITIONAL LENDING INSTITUTIONS 
An increasing number of innovative structures and 
facilities have cropped up in recent years to provide 
ﬁxed-income investment instruments to fund social 
purposes:
Citylife has issued six zero coupon bonds to 
investors who are prepared to forgo capital growth 
and interest income on their money, but who are 
guaranteed it back after ﬁve years. The bonds 
invest the interest in social enterprises and local 
communities to regenerate social, economic and 
intellectual capital. The bond is held under trust 
and investors have a bank-guaranteed return on their 
investment. Citylife structures ﬁve-year ﬁxed-term 
loans with compound interest.20  
Compartamos is Latin America’s biggest provider 
of microﬁnance – small loans aimed at budding 
entrepreneurs in areas of severe poverty. In order to 
access ﬁnance to grow to reach one million clients, it 
offered a US$45m bond – the ﬁrst of its kind for the 
microﬁnance sector – underwritten by Banamex, the 
Mexican subsidiary of Citigroup.21 
BIGinvest is an organisation that lends and 
provides capacity support directly to social 
enterprises and community development ﬁnance 
institutions (CDFIs) in the UK. It has accessed 
£3.5m of loan funding and is accredited for 
Community Investment Tax Relief (see below) and as 
18 See discussion at   
www.environmental-ﬁnance.com/
onlinews/2809ifc.htm.
19 Source: Foundation Center’s Bi-
Annual PRI Report.
20 Citylife is an independent UK 
charitable organisation, incorporated 
as an Industrial and Provident 
Society. Zero coupon bonds are 
issued at below face value, and 
then, rather than paying interest, 
slowly grow to their full face value 
at maturity.
21 Accion International website: 
www.accion.org
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a wholesale CDFI. It ﬁlls a market gap in ﬁnancing 
social enterprises and CDFIs, working in partnership 
with CDFIs and banks to build underwriting capacity 
and demonstrating that deals can be underwritten 
successfully. It is an initiative of The Big Issue, 
ShoreBank, Bank of Scotland and the Phoenix Fund.
Calvert Foundation has long offered its registered 
Community Investment Notes – through which 
investors can channel capital into disadvantaged 
communities – to retail investors in the US as 
an open-ended investment note programme. Its 
current footprint is approximately US$100m, 
sourced from 2,500 investors, placed into almost 
200 entities globally. In January 2005, the 
Calvert Foundation announced the “wiring” of its 
Community Investment Notes – the ﬁrst time that 
such community investment instruments have 
been available electronically for both individual 
and institutional investors, through brokers across 
the US. This capital is then structured for a 
broad range of nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt borrowers, 
including an increasing number of social enterprises 
(including a recent US$10m social enterprise 
commitment catalysed by support from the Case 
and Skoll Foundations). Traditionally, however, 
capital has been used to ﬁnance affordable housing, 
microﬁnance and other asset-based strategies. 
The Community Investment Tax Credit (CITR), 
introduced in the UK in 2003, was developed in 
an effort to increase the availability of funds for 
social enterprises and small businesses located 
in disadvantaged areas. A form of economically 
targeted investing, CITR accounts offered a tax 
credit of 5% of their deposit a year for ﬁve years, as 
well as interest on their deposits. 
But Charity Bank, one of the main providers of 
CITR funding, stopped accepting deposits under 
the scheme last August, and Triodos Bank took 
deposits for less than a month last year and is no 
longer offering CITR accounts. Both are working 
with policy makers to address some of the scheme’s 
practical difﬁculties.22
In the US, in particular, there is an increasing 
number of revolving loan funds, such as Nonproﬁt 
Finance Fund, which provide analysis and ﬂexible, 
frequently unsecured, ﬁnancing that nonproﬁts 
typically can’t get from other sources. Across the 
USA, NFF works with over 170 funders, including 
ﬁnancial institutions, foundations and government 
agencies, to develop new ways of meeting the capital 
growth needs of the nonproﬁt sector. 
Several innovations were sparked through the 
creation of loan guarantee funds which have altered 
the risk proﬁle for investors in social enterprises. 
In Hungary, the IFC’s Hungary Energy Efﬁciency 
Co-ﬁnancing Program structured guarantees and 
technical assistance to catalyse US$5.7m in lending 
for energy efﬁciency by local ﬁnancial institutions. 
Homeless International’s Community-Led Finance 
Facility has nearly £11m in funding which provides 
loans and technical assistance for community-based 
organisations implementing slum redevelopment 
projects in India and Kenya. The guarantee portions 
of this facility allowed debt providers such as 
Citibank to commit capital to projects in these poor 
communities where they never before would have 
invested. Furthermore, Tembeka Social Investment 
Company in South Africa was originally created in 
1996 as a guarantee fund to leverage funds from 
local banks to social ventures such as microﬁnance 
institutions. As a result of a technical market study 
in 2002, it decided to become more of a wholesale 
ﬁnancial services provider through soft loans and 
equity to NGOs, trusts, credit unions, community 
organisations and development companies serving 
disadvantaged communities. 
The Global Exchange for Social Investment 
(GEXSI), has also worked to create incentives, risk 
limitations, and development investment services. In 
partnership with VantagePoint, GEXSI has brought 
together insurers, bankers, social entrepreneurs, and 
development aid agencies to create a global Social 
Investment-Re-insurance Facility (SIRIF).23 The 
SIRIF proposal is to apply development aid funds to 
guarantee and insure market-oriented private sector 
development investment relevant to the realisation of 
the UN Millennium Development Goals.
EQUITY-LIKE CAPITAL
Equity-like capital avoids problems that social 
enterprises have historically had with issuing 
equity.24 It typically takes the form of a deeply 
subordinated long-term loan (junior to all other 
debt). If structured appropriately it can serve as 
patient capital similar to preferred stock. This differs 
from the equity described above in that investors 
using equity-like instruments tend to be more 
focused on keeping social value creation a priority 
over ﬁnancial value creation. Current providers of 
equity-like ﬁnance in the UK (Venturesome, Aston 
Reinvestment Trust and Local Investment Fund) 
have all had very different experiences with the 
model. In the US, a codiﬁed example of this sort 
of capital is the Equity Equivalent Investment 
22 Connon, H., Brown’s social 
banking scheme fails to catch on, 
The Observer, 2 April 2006. 
23 See download of report at  
www.gexsi.org/downloads.htm 
24 Howard, L. and Giddens, M. 
(editor) (2004), Equity-like Capital 
for Social Ventures, Bridges 
Community Ventures, London.
www.bridgesventures.com/
downloads/social_venture_fund.pdf
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(EQ2) – loans that function somewhat like equity 
for nonproﬁts and count towards Community 
Reinvestment Act fulﬁlment for bank investors.25 
Bridges Community Ventures deﬁnes “equity-
like” capital as high risk, relatively high return, 
patient, and uncollateralised, looking instead to 
future cash ﬂows to provide repayment. These 
are indeed many of the characteristics that must 
necessarily be included in any risk capital structure. 
In general, we ﬁnd that the UK market has begun to 
accelerate its experimentation on developing capital 
that meets this proﬁle.26 
Further research and development in this area of 
capital ﬁnance is being undertaken by organisations 
such as the Calvert Foundation and Good Capital 
in the US, and Social Investment Scotland, Triodos 
Bank and Bridges Community Ventures in Europe.
GRANTS
Nonproﬁt social enterprises have traditionally 
accessed donations from individuals and through 
grants from government, foundations and 
corporations.27 Of course, these resources require 
no ﬁnancial repayment. Grants from private sources, 
HIGH RISK
EXPECTED LOSS %
FINANCIAL RETURN ON  
AN INVESTMENT
TERM OF INVESTMENT
INVOLVEMENT IN BUSINESS
EXIT OF INVESTMENT
LIQUIDATION RIGHTS
VOTING RIGHTS
Source: BCV Interviews, Home Ofﬁce report on Patient Capital, Social Enterprise in the Balance, CAF (2004)
Grants
100%
0
Often short periods
Low (except venture 
philanthropy)
n/a
None
No
FEATURES OF DIFFERENT FUNDING INSTRUMENTS
Patient capital
20-50%
-50% – c.10%
Repayment holidays
Some (through 
partners)
Repayment
None/subordinate
No
Pure equity
10-20%
No limit
Undeﬁned
Depends on success
High (through board)
IPO, sale, layout
Residual
Through ownership
Equity-like
10-20%
Variable up to 30%
5-7 years
Depends on success
High (through board)
Royalty, repayment 
or APO
Subordinate
Structured in loan 
agreement
LOW RISK
Loans
1-8%
Fixed 5-18%
Fixed term
Low
Repayment
First priority
No
25 Federal Reserve Bank of SF:  
www.frbsf.org/community/
investments/eq2.html
26 It should be noted that Bridges 
Community Ventures is not in the 
business of supplying equity-like 
capital to nonproﬁts, but rather 
equity to for-proﬁts. 
www.bridgesventures.com
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such as foundations, are typically short-term, 
project-based commitments of relatively small 
amounts of capital. Though sometimes renewed 
annually, these are often one-time injections of 
capital that may be paid out over one to three years. 
Despite claims that grants represent the 
equity of the nonproﬁt sector, in truth they usually 
lack the characteristics of mainstream equity 
investments. Although, in a technical sense, 
grants can certainly serve the purpose of “equity” 
capital for nonproﬁt social enterprises, they 
present signiﬁcant challenges: 
 small amounts of capital committed over a short 
time period restrict major growth
 restrictions on the use of funds results in 
limited resources targeted for general operations/
development and may provide incentives for 
activities not well aligned with the strategy for 
achieving its social mission and professional 
management due to the incredible attraction of “free 
money”
 application process is often bureaucratic and 
drawn out, and the hidden costs of fundraising and 
reporting cause inefﬁciencies28 
 social enterprises that do not hold charitable tax 
status usually cannot receive grants.
Because of the third-party payer structure of 
a signiﬁcant portion of the nonproﬁt sector, much 
social good gets funded by grants. However, grants 
more accurately represent consumption of capital, 
not investment. And, if a funder sees social good as 
a commodity, then their interest is in funding the 
lowest-cost provider of the commodity. Commodity 
purchasers are generally disinterested in funding 
innovation or value-added services. Instead they 
reward suppliers that eliminate “frills” such as 
research, additional administrative infrastructure 
aimed at improving organisational efﬁciencies, or 
employee education and development. 
Of course, social entrepreneurs want to create 
the most efﬁcient and effective means of delivering 
a social outcome. But the risk capital to expand a 
successful enterprise usually doesn’t come directly 
from its customers: most enterprises would be 
heavily constrained if they could only tap expansion 
capital from their proﬁt margins. In the for-proﬁt 
sector, venture and other expansion capital ﬁll 
these needs. 
In contrast to investing in a product or service, 
the mantra in venture investing is that the three 
most important things in an expanding enterprise 
are the management team, the management team 
and the management team. That’s because venture 
capitalists are investing in people they believe can 
create huge value. The effect of this is to direct 
funds not simply to the delivery of a service or 
product, but to build an organisation capable of 
taking an idea, innovation or service/product to 
its next level of development and thereby create 
greater long-term capacity for the organisation 
to deliver quality and value to any given market 
or community. This venture capital approach is 
focused on building organisations and management 
capacity upon the base of demonstrated success or 
innovation. When applied to investing philanthropic 
capital, this translates to high levels of engagement 
and the adoption of business-based practices 
– essentially grant capital invested in an ambitious 
plan to create or expand an enterprise that will have 
results that far exceed what would have happened 
if those same funds were spent on consumption of 
social good. 
Therefore, if grants are to function more like 
equity for the sector, some innovations in deploying 
or structuring grant capital might need to be:
 establishing longer, larger relationships to lower 
fundraising costs and measure impact more closely, 
including multi-year grants 
 designing donor syndicates around standardised 
offerings
 high engagement management and capacity 
support from donors.
In the ﬁnal analysis, the current landscape of capital 
for social enterprise is somewhat ill formed. There is 
increasing activity and interest, but very little activity 
squarely focused on the risk-taking expansion capital 
needs of social enterprises, whether for nonproﬁts or 
for-proﬁts. The most compelling opportunity for the 
ﬁeld is to institutionalise new facilities for capital 
and engagement structures. A number of interesting 
experiments will likely be initiated in the near to 
intermediate future.
27 The US had US$241bn in 
philanthropic funds in 2002, 
provided by 37 million individual 
donors, 60,000 foundations, 
400,000 corporate investors and 
bequests. Government grants 
totalled over US$65m. Meehan, 
W., Kilmer, D. and O’Flanagan, M., 
Investing in society, Stanford Social 
Innovation Review, Spring 2004, 
pp34-43.
28 For-proﬁt capital market: US$2-4 
spent per US$100 raised for legal, 
marketing, admin. Not-for-proﬁt 
capital market: US$10-24 per 
US$100 raised for buying donor 
lists, direct mail/telephone calls, 
and CEOs spend 30-60% of time on 
fund-raising. Meehan, W., Kilmer, 
D. and O’Flanagan, M., Investing in 
society, Stanford Social Innovation 
Review, Spring 2004, pp34-43.
18 NOTHING VENTURED, NOTHING GAINED: ADDRESSING CRITICAL GAPS IN RISK-TAKING CAPITAL FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
SKOLL CENTRE FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
SOLUTIONS
CHAPTER 4
Central to any solution must be the intention to 
create a relationship between providers and users 
of capital wherein the investor becomes a risk 
partner in the endeavour and the social entrepreneur 
contracts to move appropriate and manageable value 
back to the investor over time. Upon this foundation 
a new kind of risk-taking expansion capital can be 
imagined, sourced either through a new kind of 
investor proﬁle, through blending more traditional 
philanthropic and commercial capital, or both. 
SOLUTION 1: CHANGE THE TERMS OF 
ENGAGEMENT AND RULES OF THE GAME
The most audacious option in terms of sourcing 
capital is to recast some of the rules we’ve taken for 
granted. Investor engagement needs to complement 
the development of true risk-taking expansion 
capital. We need a new “contract” – a re-evaluation 
of the relationship between investor and enterprise. 
Investors have to be apprised of the cost of 
doing good through these deals, in the same way 
that social enterprises need to face the friction that 
exists in their business model between mission 
and proﬁtability. Both parties have to ﬁgure out the 
central expectations around the often-challenging 
intersection of risk, return and social value creation: 
which metrics matter to whom and why the business 
and social impact is best intertwined. 
Enterprise managers have to dig deeper and 
supply a rationale that is both compelling and distilled 
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to a utilitarian core that is accepted by numerous 
stakeholders. The investor then needs to internalise 
this value to create a new expectation of return – that 
is essentially a process of valuing external societal 
beneﬁts within the returns of the deal. 
Philanthropy is catalytic and critical; it has a 
fundamental role to play. Investing in commercial 
activity for market returns, yet with a concern for 
people and planet, is well-established and creating 
positive impacts in the world. But new hybrid 
models in the middle – social enterprises – require 
something of both these worlds. And though there 
is no hierarchy of virtue between the left, right or 
middle of the spectrum, there is beauty and utility in 
a well-balanced business, creating real social impact 
without the need for separate ill-integrated service 
programmes running in parallel. 
SOLUTION 2: BY ALL MEANS, USE 
PHILANTHROPY TO UNLOCK MARKET-BASED 
CAPITAL IF THAT IS EXPEDIENT
It’s time to be pragmatic. If investors won’t 
embrace new values, subsidy has to be brought in 
(and both the early adoption of the new, and the 
blending of the old, can coexist). In an ideal world, 
perhaps, all investors would be able to accept a 
homogeneous proposition with regards to these 
considerations. Then no donor or philanthropic 
investor would be construed as subsidising another 
more market-rate investor. 
Then again, mainstream capital markets are rife 
with all manner of cross-subsidisation. Tax credits, 
guarantees and low-interest loans from various 
government and quasi-government agencies (or 
even private foundations) course through deals in 
many sectors of the economy. At the same time, we 
must realise that getting investors to understand 
a more balanced return goes against much of the 
conventional wisdom of the market. So, while we 
might advocate a more balanced expectation, a good 
argument can be made for not pushing boulders up 
hills – using “softer” capital to leverage and support 
more conventional market rate capital is often the 
most expedient path.
So the answer is “both”: encourage investors 
to offer capital and use strategies that blend grants 
and soft money to unlock more market-rate capital. 
We should nurture a new set of expectations among 
an ever-widening investor base – one that respects 
blended value – while simultaneously mixing grant 
or concessionary investment capital into deals with 
more market rate capital. 
Over time, hopefully, investors will become 
increasingly comfortable with new ways of thinking 
about the goals of their investment. But for now, 
whether the new capital shows up in the exact form 
required, or in components that can be blended 
into the form required, is academic except for the 
transaction costs to the social enterprise. 
SOLUTION 3: INSTITUTIONALISE 
A NEW KIND OF CAPITAL
Regardless of the manner in which the capital comes 
to the table, we must then turn to the speciﬁcs of 
the risk-taking expansion capital to be deployed. 
For social enterprises within a for-proﬁt 
structure, private equity ﬁts the bill, at least 
structurally. The challenge for these enterprises 
is not one of which instrument to use, but rather 
how to attract unconventional investors and 
then negotiate expectations with them. The next 
task is to build understanding and acceptance 
of corporate purpose, to design approaches that 
insure against mission drift, and to set clear 
expectations around unconventional (read “below-
market”) risk/return models. 
However, advancing speciﬁc answers to the 
challenge of the lack of risk-taking capital to ﬁll the 
expansion gap for nonproﬁt social enterprises is a 
little more complicated. Let us examine a number of 
concepts, culled from social enterprise practitioners 
and pioneering work being done to develop new 
social ﬁnance instruments.29 It is our contention that 
a number of these will need to be adopted, adapted, 
and deployed by investors in social enterprises over 
the coming years.
What might the characteristics look like of ideal 
risk-taking expansion capital for the nonproﬁt social 
enterprise? The assembled capital has to understand 
the costs and beneﬁts of doing good. Most of the 
solutions that have been either proposed or tested 
draw from the following characteristics:
 links to success – repayment and/or yield 
dependent upon outcomes or revenues
 minimised debt service – non-amortising principal 
and/or capitalising interest
 deep subordination – ability to support other debt
 patience – Long terms, even unspeciﬁed and 
rolled forward, or determined by revenue 
 ﬂexibility – the ability to use prepayment or 
demand for repayment to course correct 
 exit – a strategy for how investors and enterprises 
can end the relationship.
29 In addition to input from our 
readers and contributors, the 
authors wish to acknowledge a 
focus group discussion that was 
conducted at www.xigi.net in June 
2006, during which numerous 
practitioners commented upon and 
proposed a number of these models 
and instruments. 
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Let’s explore a few models that could prove 
attractive:
One might be modelled on a vehicle from the 
conventional capital markets, a “Zero Coupon 
Bond.” Though technically a liability, this 
structure may be designed with expectations 
around risk, for instance, to be deeply subordinate 
to all other liabilities. The zero coupon aspect 
removes debt service and compounds exposure to 
the investor. In one scenario, the social enterprise 
would raise US$1m. Assuming an 8% compound 
yield, the note would then slowly appreciate 
over a ﬁve-year period to a maturity value of 
US$1.47m. (Note that the deferred interest is 
still treated as interest for taxable investors in 
most cases. A variation of this instrument is the 
Social Value Note, a zero coupon bond tied to 
index options in order to enhance the potential 
for a ﬁnancial upside to be offered to investors.30) 
In this manner, minimised debt service and 
deep subordination are combined to create a 
manageable construct. The interest is, in effect, 
capitalised during the relationship, allowing all 
cash ﬂows to grow the business. The exit is ﬁrmly 
established in timing. And, if the business is 
successful, then the enterprise would probably be 
able to reﬁnance the debt at a lower rate from a 
PRI or other friendly source once the earlier stage 
risk was taken out of the equation.
To the above model could be added the 
ﬂexibility of the option to “call” the note back from 
investors, essentially repaying it early at the will of 
the enterprise after a certain time period, say three 
years. Alternatively, the investors could “put” the 
note back to the enterprise (demand repayment) 
if certain benchmarks of mission or ﬁnancial 
management were not met.
Another example could be a “Preferred Share” 
model. This combines the patience of a long rolling 
term with minimised debt service, ﬂexibility, links 
to success and deep subordination. A base coupon 
is stipulated, but only to be paid upon successfully 
reaching benchmark X, though it is capitalised 
regardless. Thereafter, when Y happens investors get 
another structured payment of a premium of interest. 
And, if in any year threshold Z is met, a portion of 
principal value is returned. That said, there is no 
maturity stipulated, debt service is not necessarily 
in play, links to business events drive carefully 
structured yield and there is a stipulated ﬂexibility 
in repayment built into the model. But, again, this is 
still technically a liability on the balance sheet of the 
nonproﬁt social enterprise.31 
A relatively straightforward model is simply 
to construct what has on occasion been called a 
“grant with a put”. In this scenario a funder simply 
makes a technically but only loosely recoverable 
grant to a social enterprise. It stipulates that it will 
have no recourse to the assets of the enterprise. 
But, a success threshold on a core programme 
and business metric is identiﬁed, above which the 
grant begins to be repaid. This extends through 
to a ceiling upon which the total grant plus a 
premium has been repaid to the funder. This can 
be a relatively elegant and simple model that meets 
many of the characteristics deemed attractive in 
this type of capital.
Those seeking a work-around to the inability to 
own a nonproﬁt outright might consider a “Revenue 
Rights” structure. For example, investors provide 
a social enterprise with US$1m today, then, over 
time, receive a certain percentage of its revenue 
above a certain threshold, or number of units sold, 
or whatever the appropriate benchmark might be. 
Though an interesting model, it raises the challenge 
of truly understanding margins and being appropriate 
to a given business model. How would this affect 
the ﬁnancial statements? Would social enterprises 
and their boards consider such a contract? Much 
groundwork would need to be done to consider 
such a structure, but in certain circumstances it 
could be quite attractive, and perhaps escape being 
considered a liability at all (or at least one with a 
set value). This is obviously the most radical of the 
examples in meeting some of the characteristics 
sought after.
Little use has been made of these models 
to date. And, unfortunately for nonproﬁts, they 
generally show up as liabilities (with the possible 
exception of the revenue rights model). In the case 
of a liability, no matter how carefully structured 
the expectations, and well matched the terms, a 
nonproﬁt enterprise that shows debt on its balance 
sheet will encounter difﬁculties when arranging its 
ﬁnances and seeking further capital. 
So, by combining the characteristics of 
linking to success, minimised debt service, deep 
subordination, patience, ﬂexibility, and a plausible 
exit strategy, and adding a shared contract between 
investor and entrepreneur on understood value and 
the cost of doing good, a structure approaching 
equity-like expansion capital can be fashioned. 
30 Emerson, J. (2001). Please see 
the article by that same name at  
www.blendedvalue.org.
31 The Calvert Foundation is working 
to get legal and accounting approval 
that would actually let this sit on 
the nonproﬁt balance sheet as a net 
asset. These models have also been 
referred to as “Grants with Puts”.
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CAPITAL CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 5
It becomes clear there is a rich landscape of 
actors and strategies in the capital markets serving 
social enterprise, yet a signiﬁcant gap remains 
in the availability of risk-taking capital to fund 
the expansion of promising organisations. The 
outcome? Much of the opportunity represented by 
these maturing social enterprises remains blocked 
or is channelled into overly slow, organic growth. 
Attainment of an optimal capital structure remains 
out of reach. 
Perversely, start-up social entrepreneurs are often 
able to absorb grant capital (or “friends and family 
equity”) to get the ball rolling, while later-stage 
enterprises stall due to the massive gap between 
start-up capital and later-stage mission-oriented debt 
ﬁnancing. Regardless of the enterprises’ for-proﬁt 
or nonproﬁt status, if their risk/return model isn’t 
“strong enough” in conventional terms, they tend to 
stall in the expansion phases before lower-risk debt 
capital becomes available.
What then happens is the root of much 
frustration for investor and nonproﬁt social enterprise 
alike, as the enterprise is left to ﬁt debt capital and 
grant capital into an equity capital gap. And for-
proﬁt enterprises struggle with equity investors that 
are seeking conventional returns, when their hybrid 
social purpose business just does not support this. 
Regardless, investors and entrepreneurs experience 
the pains of the mismatched expectations that follow. 
What is clear is that many new investment 
opportunities and instruments will be created 
– because the gap in the market will demand 
it. Investors are looking for ways to structure 
their capital in more effective terms and social 
entrepreneurs require new forms of capital to 
complement the next stage of their development. 
With that in mind, it must also be understood 
that with these new approaches and investment 
initiatives there will also be a level of failure. High-
risk capital – by its very deﬁnition – carries greater 
exposure for both investor and investee. Where there 
is innovation there will be failure. However, that 
failure may be hedged if those involved take care to 
leverage the existing knowledge and draw upon the 
talent present in the business and nonproﬁt sectors 
which may best be applied to this challenging task. 
In undertaking what is in some ways a capital 
experiment that will take us into new terrain, it 
is imperative that adequate attention be paid to 
clarifying the speciﬁc terms and expectations of 
those engaged in each investment. Traditional 
term sheets and understanding of returns may well 
not be enough to get the deal done. Regardless of 
balance sheet and deal term considerations, if the 
expectations between stakeholder and enterprise 
are carefully and honestly deﬁned, and the terms 
structured to match the needs of the enterprise as 
discussed in this paper, it is possible to envision 
the evolution of a host of successful risk-taking 
expansion capital instruments which may meet 
the needs of not only those speciﬁcally involved in 
the deal, but also an array of stakeholders, from 
community residents to programme participants 
to low-income individuals seeking new stairs upon 
which to climb towards real economic development 
and not simple reliance on grants and relief. 
Importantly, though perhaps a broader issue, is 
the reality that in the absence of signiﬁcant, shared 
understanding and experience with regard to these 
instruments, the high transaction costs of executing 
every deal as a new cutting-edge negotiation are 
going to be prohibitive, limiting the number of such 
investments and thus the amount of capital capable 
of moving into these emerging markets. In order 
to build a viable capital market in this area, those 
creating the ﬁnancial innovations of the future must 
take adequate care to document their work, terms 
and practices in order to popularise investment 
models, engage in syndication opportunities 
and, through shared or commonly endorsed due 
diligence practices, decrease the transaction costs of 
individual investments and the market as a whole. 
Finally, at its core, this work requires a rethinking 
of capital investing and enterprise development. 
This includes the need for us to advance a broader 
understanding of the full, blended value created 
by capital and brought to market by ventures of 
all types – nonproﬁt and for-proﬁt. The ﬁnancial 
landscape and instruments presented in this paper 
in many ways represent the missing links between 
mainstream investing and traditional philanthropy. 
And this capital gap will continue to shrink as 
increasing numbers of people transcend the artiﬁcial 
value barrier between “doing well and doing good.” 
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SELECTED ONLINE 
RESOURCES
Accion International
www.accion.org
BIGinvest
www.biginvest.co.uk
Blended Value (resources on “blended 
value” and “blended value investing”) 
www.blendedvalue.org 
www.blendedblog.org
Calvert Foundation (information 
on community development, 
microenterprise and social enterprise 
investments)
www.calvertfoundation.org 
CDVCA (Community Development 
Venture Capital Alliance)
www.cdvca.org
Citylife
www.citylifeltd.org
Community Investing Center
www.communityinvest.org
Esmée Fairbairn Foundation
www.esmeefairbairn.org.uk/loans.html
FB Heron Foundation 
www.fbheron.org
GEXSI (The Global Exchange for  
Social Investment)
www.gexsi.org
Good Capital 
www.goodcap.net
Nonproﬁt Finance Fund 
www.nffusa.org
Partners for the Common Good
http://pcgloanfund.org
RSF
www.rsfoundation.org
Social Edge (an online social 
entrepreneurship community)
www.socialedge.org
Social Enterprise Alliance (a social 
enterprise member association)
www.se-alliance.org
Xigi.net (database, blog and mapping of 
the social capital market)
www.xigi.net
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